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Abstract
Cox uses data from the 1992-93  and 1997-98 Vietnam  many households  also changed from recipients to givers
Living Standards Surveys  (VLSS)  to describe patterns of  and vice versa between  surveys.  Changes  in private
money transfers between  households.  Rapid economic  transfers appear responsive  to changes  in  household pre-
growth during the 1990s  did little to diminish the  transfer  income,  demographic changes,  and life-course
importance  of private transfers  in Vietnam.  Private  events. Transfer  inflows rise upon retirement and
transfers are large  and widespread  in both surveys, and  widowhood,  for example, and are  positively associated
are much larger than public transfers.  Private transfers  with increases in health  expenditures.  It also appears that
appear to function like means-tested  public transfers,  private transfer inflows increased  for households affected
flowing from better-off to worse-off households and  by Typhoon Linda,  which devastated Vietnam's
providing old age support in retirement.  Panel  evidence  southernmost provinces  in late  1997.
suggests some hysteresis in private transfer  patterns, but
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This paper investigates patterns of private,  inter-household income transfers using the 1992/93  and
1997/98 Vietnam Living Standards  Surveys (VLSS). I explore several questions,  such as: Do
private transfers help equalize incomes?  Has Vietnam's rapid economic growth during the 1990's
diminished the importance of private transfers?  What are the socioeconomic and demographic
factors that appear most strongly associated with transfer behavior?  How much private transfer
income flows from adult children to their parents?  How much flows from parents to children?
How might gifts differ from informal loans?
There are several reasons why private income transfers between households are important,
especially for a poor but rapidly growing country like Vietnam.  Private  transfers can perform the
same functions that public transfers do in richer countries.  For example, private old-age support
can act like social security for many elderly households.  Further, since the beginning of modem
analyses of private transfer behavior economists have speculated that private and public transfers
can interact.  Most notably, Gary Becker (1974)  and Robert Barro (1974) argued that expansions
of public transfers could conceivably  "crowd out" existing private transfers in such a way as to
leave the distribution of living standards unchanged.
But the specter of "crowding out" is not the only reason to be interested in private transfer
behavior.  Private transfers have been found to act like credit markets in helping households
overcome borrowing constraints  (e.g., Cox (1990)),  and they can assist households in dealing
with risk (e.g., Cox and Jimenez (1998), Morduch (1995),  Townsend (1994)).  Further, they can
help finance human capital investment by providing support to younger workers who have recently
left home.  Private income  transfers could represent one side of a transaction in which in-kind help
is exchanged between households (e.g., Cox (1987)).
The descriptive work below does not settle any of the deeper issues connected with
crowding out or motivations for private  transfers.  Instead it is a first step toward understanding
the basics of private transfer behavior in Vietnam.  For example, in order for the problem of
crowding out to have any policy relevance, private transfers need to be widespread  and large2
enough to be supplanted by public transfers.  Obviously, if there are few private transfers to begin
with, there is little to be crowded out by expansion of public safety nets.  I fmd that private,
transfers are indeed common and substantial in Vietnam, especially  as a means of support for the
elderly.
Further, much of the analysis in this paper makes use of the panel aspect of the VLSS.
Despite the value of panel data for studying private transfer behavior,  few true panel studies exist.'
I explore the relationship between changes  in private transfers  and changes  in household
socioeconomic and demographic variables and find that private transfers appear responsive to
changes  in earning potential and life events such as retirement or widowhood.
My analysis is limited by the data in two ways.  First, though private transfers  can take
many forms, such as time spent helping someone or the provision of moral support and
companionship,  I focus only on money transfers.  The only in-kind transfers that I examine  are the
money value of in-kind gifts, which I include along with monetary gifts.  Second, though many
transfers occur within rather than between households, almost all of my analysis is concerned with
the latter.
In addition, I work mainly with a narrower definition of private transfers than the one used
in earlier, related work using just the 1992/93 VLSS (Cox, Fetzer and Jimenez (1998)).  There are
two reasons  for doing this.  First, I focus on transfer measures  that contain information about the
sources of transfers received  and the destinations of  transfers given, in order to analyze the
directions of transfers according to generation.  Second, I concentrate on transfers that are
measured consistently  between the 1992/93 and 1997/98 surveys in creating a panel for private
transfers.
There is a further, methodological,  limitation of this study.  I limited my analyses to simple
cross-tabulations because I want to provide an overview of the data that is wide-ranging and
'The  most well-known panel study for the United  States, Altonji,  Hayashi and Kotlikoff (1997), really
only uses a cross-section of private transfer information.  Kathleen McGarry  (2000) uses panel data on
private transfers to test for parental altruism in the United States.  Aside from Rosenzweig's (1988)  study of
private transfers  in India, there are few other panel studies of private transfers for developing countries.3
simple, rather than narrow and nuanced.  I hope this descriptive work stimulates interest in testing
some of the more complex policy and behavioral issues such as crowding out.
Despite the simple methods, this paper reaches several firm conclusions about private
transfers:
*  Rapid economic growth has not diminished the importance of private transfers in
Vietnam
*  Private transfers are the main means of income redistribution in Vietnam and they are
more than twice the size of public transfers
*  Private transfers flow mostly from adult children to their parents, rather than the other
way around
*  Those who give transfers are in better economic shape than those who receive them
*  Inflows of private transfers increase with the retirement of the household head
*  Hardly any gifts are given to non-relatives, but half of all loans are given to non-
relatives
*  Receiving private transfers in 1992/93  increases the chances of receiving them 1997/98,
but a non-trivial number of  households changed from givers to recipients, or vice-
versa, between surveys
*  Most private transfers flow between households sharing  the same locale, but many
transfers cross regional boundaries  and a significant fraction of transfer income is
received from foreign sources
*  Victirs of typhoon Linda, a devastating storm that hit Vietnam's southernmost
provinces just before the  1997/98 survey, appeared to receive  increased private
transfers as a consequence.
Before getting to the details of these and other results, I first provide some background to
help put the results in perspective.
II.  Background
Vietnam experienced  extraordinary economic growth in the 1990's, with living standards a
full two-thirds higher at the decade's end than at its beginning.  Vietnam is still a poor,
agrarian country, but it has become a lot less of each in recent years.  Headcount poverty
plunged from 58 to 37 percent in just 5 years-from 1992/93  to 1997/98-thanks to its4
broadly based growth (Glewwe, Gragnolati and Zaman, 2000).  Agriculture accounted for
just 25 percent of GDP at the end of  the decade, compared to over 40 percent at the
beginning of the decade.  Despite agriculture's  dwindling share of GDP, farm productivity
growth has been impressive.  Increased rice yields have made Vietnam the world's second
leading rice exporter.
Vietnam's growth is due to two things.  The first is a series of reform policies (Doi
Moi) allowing free enterprise  in farming, foreign direct investment and elimination of price
controls and trade barriers.  The second, related to the first, is the start of a transition from
agriculture to manufacturing.
Despite recent, dramatic progress, Vietnam  still has a severe poverty problem,
which its public safety nets are ill equipped to handle (van de Walle,  this volume, 2001).
An alternative to public safety nets is the system of informal, private safety nets in the form
of inter-household  transfers.  Earlier, two co-authors  and I (Cox, Fetzer and Jimenez
(1998)) explored the extent, magnitude and patterns for these transfers  in Vietnam using the
first Vietnam Living Standards  Survey (VLSS), which conducted in 1992/93.  We found
that private transfers were large, widespread,  and frequently followed patterns similar to
means-tested public transfers, in that they appeared to flow from better off to worse off
households.  We concluded our study by noting that private transfers could be affected by
Vietnam's economic liberalization  in ways that were difficult to predict.  Our paper
provided only a "snapshot" of private transfers because it was based on a single cross-
section.
This paper extends that work by adding information from the second VLSS,
conducted in  1997/98.  These two waves make it possible to track Vietnam's private
transfers during a time of rapid economic growth, and to examine  how they are related to
changes in household incomes and life events.  Another extension of earlier work is to
focus separately on familial giving versus lending;  the earlier  1998 paper focused mostly on
aggregated transfers.5
Conventional  wisdom suggests that economic growth would weaken a household's
ties with extended kin living elsewhere and would contribute to the ascendancy  of the
nuclear family.2 It also suggests that growth would alter the direction of private transfers,
with less going from children to parents and more going from parents to children.
It is important to know what growth did to Vietnam's inter-household transfers.  If,
for example, extended familial networks do indeed begin to fall apart, growth might worsen
income uncertainty  and inequality.  Further,  the change in the direction of transfers, or so-
called "demographic  transition" could threaten to leave a generation of elderly deprived of
familial support.  Conversely, failure to attain demographic  transition could leave younger
persons short of the funds needed for acquiring  human capital.
Rapid economic growth in the region is, of course, not unprecedented;  its impact on
family networks in other countries  has not gone unnoticed.  Most notably, Lee, Parish and
Willis (1994) found that the Taiwan's rapid economic growth did little to diminish
children's support for their parents.  Like Taiwan, Vietnam has a Confucian heritage that
emphasizes filial loyalty to parents.  And like Taiwan, Vietnam's patterns  of
intergenerational  support have changed little in the face of rapid economic growth, as will
be shown below.
III.  Patterns  in  Private  Transfers
A.  Cross-sectional  patterns,  1992/93  VLSS
The 1992/93  VLSS was a nationwide household survey of 4800 households.  The VLSS is part of
the World Bank's Living Standards Measurement  Study (LSMS), which collects information about
household living standards for several developing countries.  The VLSS gathered data about the
education, health and employment of household  members, for example, and about household
2 For an early  discussion of this view,  for example,  see Sussman (1953).6
composition, income and expenditures.  It also collected information about the household's
community and commodity prices.
The VLSS measured private transfers in the form of money and goods transferred between
households.  Questions  about transfer inflows were asked in the module for non-labor income,
where the head of the household was asked:
"During the past  12 months, has any member of your household received
money or goods from persons who are not members of your household?
For example, assistance sent by relatives working elsewhere,  or by children
of household members, by friends and neighbors?"
The head was then asked to provide the names of those who sent transfers and their relationship to
the person  in the household that received them (e.g., father, daughter).  The head was also asked
to place a value on in-kind transfers received.
Transfer outflows were determined  in the module for household  expenses.  The question
for outflows mirrors that of inflows.  The head was asked:
"During the past 12 months has any member of your household provided
money or goods to persons who are not members of your household?  For
example, children or relatives living elsewhere, or to other persons."
Paralleling what was asked about inflows, the head identified the person who sent each transfer
and that person's relationship to the recipient.  These transfers do not include remittances  from
someone temporarily away from home since that person is still considered a household member
and the question is concerned only with transfers between households.  I define a household as a
"recipient" if there is an affirmative answer to the question about transfer inflows, and a "giver" if
there is an affirmative answer about outflows.
About a third of the households in the 1992/93 survey were involved with private
transfers-as defined above-ither as givers, recipients, or both (Table  1).4
I The 1992/93  data set that I work with below has 4778 observations,  instead of the original 4800, because
I eliminated  19 households with missing information about total household income and another 3 for which
the head of the household  was absent and it was  impossible to determine who could be designated as the
head pro tempore.
' There  are three  other kinds of private transfers that are not counted  in the survey questions above but
available  in the VLSS:  inter-household  loans, gifts related to ceremonies  such as weddings  or funerals, and
inheritances.  Here, I focus first on this narrower definition for two reasons:  I wish to use measures that are
consisted across the two VLSS surveys and I require measures  containing information about generational7
-- -- -- -- ---  - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---  -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - --  --- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
Table  1--Households Involved in Private Transfers,  1992/93
Number  Percent
(1) Households involved in private transfers  1567  32.8
Households who only gave transfers  597  12.5
Households who only received transfers  780  16.3
Households who both gave and received  190  4.0
(2) Households who neither gave  nor received  3211  67.2
Total  (1)  +  (2)  4778  100.0
For the whole sample, including those who did not receive anything, transfer receipts
accounted for 8 percent of total household income (Table 2).  For just the sample of recipients,
they accounted  for nearly a third of income.  Public transfers are just as widespread as private one
are, but they are smaller, averaging less than 3 percent of income for the whole sample (Table 2).
Table  2--Transfers  and Total Income,  1992/93
Private  Public
Transfers  as  a perc.entage of total  income
All households  7.9  2.3
Recipient households  32. 0  11.7
Number of recipient households  970  1014
Percentage of recipient households with
pre-transfer income  in lowest  quintile  25. 0  21.8
How do private and public transfers compare in their ability to reach the very poorest
households?  First, consider the distribution of income before public or private transfers (that is,
directions  of transfers.  Loan information  is incomplete  in the 1992/93  VLSS, which has the flow of loans
received but not loans given.  This problem is remedied in the 1997/98 VLSS, so I defer my discussion of
loans until later in this paper.  Further,  the modules containing other forms of transfers (e.g.,  ceremonial
gifts) do not provide the sources of gifts received or destinations of gifts given.  Since I am concerned  with
the generational  directions of transfers, and want a consistent definition of transfers  over time for the panel
analysis,  I for now adopt a more restrictive  definition of transfers, and defer discussion of additional kinds to
transfers to a later part of this  paper.  Applying  the more inclusive definition of transfers, analyzed in Cox,
Fetzer and Jimenez (1998),  results in a much higher proportion of  households involved in private transfers,8
"pre-transfer"eincome)  and focus on the 20th,percentile.  Twenty-five percent of private-transfer
recipients had pre-transfer incomes that fell short of the 20th percentile,, compared to 22 percent of
public transfers.  So at least by this crude measure, private transfers appear marginally bettern
targeted to the poor.'
How do households  giving private transfers differ from those receiving them?  Table 3
contrasts the economic situation of givers, recipients, and those doing neither.  Because some both
gave and received, I look at net transfers-the excess of receipts over gifts and vice versa.
Table 3--Household Economic Situation by Transfer  Status,  1992/93
Net  Net
Givers  Recipients  Others
Pre-private-transfer  income  1728  1147  1171
Post-private-transfer  income  1633  16 89  1171
Fraction of  hh economically active  57.8  50 .5  55
Percentage  with unemployed members  7.1  8.7  5.0
Percentage with educated hh head  43.1  40.6  35.6
Number of households  646  913  3219
Givers  are in better economic shape than recipients are.  Consider household income before
private transfers, or "pre-private-transfer"  income.  For recipients,  this is income minus net
transfers; for givers, income plus net transfers.  (Incomes are measured on an annual, per-capita
basis, and are expressed  in thousands of dongs per year (TDY).)  Average pre-private-transfer
income of givers far exceeds that of recipients-1728 TDY versus only 1147.  At 1171 TDY, the
income of those neither giving nor receiving ("others") is in-between these values but closer to that
of recipients.  Private transfers narrow the disparity between giver and recipient income,  reducing
though the patterns of these more inclusive transfers are similar to the narrower definition considered here.  I
discuss these more inclusive transfers briefly in a later section.
'This  result could have  to do with the way public  transfers are measured  in Round 1-similar calculations
below for Round 2, which has a better measure of public transfers, indicates little difference in how private
and public transfers are targeted to the poor.9
the average income of givers to,1633 TDY and raising that of recipients to 1689 TDY.  Note too
that the post-transfer income of recipients exceeds that of the two other groups.6
Givers are better off than recipients in other ways besides pre-private  transfer income.
They have a larger proportion of economically active people in the household and experience a bit
less unemployment.  They are also better educated;  relatively more giver households are headed by
someone with at least a lower-secondary  education.
The figures in Table 3 do not prove that private transfers flow from richer to poorer
households.  Proof would require a data set with matched donors and recipients.  The VLSS
records only one side of the transaction.  For all we know, recipients could have gotten their
transfers  from households even poorer than they.  But the VLSS is a random sample of
households,  so the difference in the means of giver and recipient incomes is an unbiased estimate
of the mean difference of giver and recipient incomes.!
Givers and recipients have different demographic  characteristics  as well (Table 4).
Recipient households are more likely to be headed by an older person or a woman, and giver
households are less likely to be headed by a younger person.
Inter-household transfers and migration obviously have a lot to do with one another.  An
adult child making an inter-household transfer to parents must have already left home.  But what
about a son or daughter who takes a distant but temporary job and remits to parents?  The VLSS
downplays these because it treats temporary migrants as members of the household.  This is
probably why having a person temporarily absent from the household matters so little for
'The  reason for this apparent anomaly,  where outflows and inflows of transfers  do not balance,  is because of
transfers received  from outside of Vietnam, something that I turn to later on in this  paper.
' Further, a simple t-statistic for testing the difference in means would be biased downward, for it would not
take into account the (presumed) positive covariance between donor and recipient  incomes.  This simple t-
value (8.07)  rejects the null hypothesis of equality  of means at any popular level, which strongly suggests
that private transfers  do indeed on average flow  from higher to lower-income  households.  Note also that the
difference  in means just measures differences between domestic givers and recipients.  Taking into account
the incomes of givers from abroad would likely  strengthen  this result.10
transfers.8 Net recipients have only slightly higher percentage of absent members than the other
households  (Table 4).
Table 4--Household Demographics by Transfer Status,  1992/93
Net  Net
Givers  Recipients  Others
Percentage  headed by young  7.9  11 .1  11.8
Percentage headed by elderly  13.2  26 .1  15.1
Percentage headed by female  20.9  35 .9  21.5
Percentage with absent members  10.6  12 .6  10.2
Household size  5.8  5.4  5.9
Number of households  646  91 3  3219
Table 4 shows that the elderly (defined as age 60 and over) are over-represented  among
transfer recipients; but the young (defined as age 30 and under) are not.  These figures  suggest that
transfers tend to flow from young to old, and more detailed calculations reinforce this result.
Givers were asked who the recipient was (e.g., his or her father,  sister, son, father-in-law,  etc.).
Likewise, recipients were asked who the donor was.  I classified transfers by generational
direction, using information about both transfers  received and transfers given.  For instance, I
added transfers given to older people with transfers received from younger people to get total
transfers  from young to old.  Transfers from old to young,  sibling to sibling, and so forth are
computed the same way.9 Figure  1 displays this breakdown of private  transfers.
Figure  1 illustrates the importance  of private old-age support.  The value of transfers from
young to old are more than twice as large  as those from old to young (41 percent opposed to 17
percent).  This is exactly the opposite of what is observed in developed countries.  (In the United
8A temporarily absent household member is defined as follows:  (1) the person is considered by the survey
respondent to be a household member, and (2) the person is reported to have been away from the household
for 3 or more months out of the previous  12 months.
I I could have just as easily concentrated  only on either transfers received or transfers given alone to
calculate generational  directions.  By aggregating  information from both sides of the transaction  I am not
double counting, but instead am averaging over the two sources of  transfer information, gifts and receipts.States, for example,' financial  transfers young to old are rare; most transfers go in the opposite
direction.)  Another striking thing about Figure  1  is the importance of transfers between  siblings,
which account for 29 percent of transfer flows.
o  41%  Young  to old
0  29%  Sibling  to  sibling
/  17%  Old  to young
o  6% Spouse  to spouse
o  4%  Between  other  relatives
D  3%  Between  non-relatives
Figure  1.  Generational  Directions  of  Private  Transfers,  1992/93
Most of what I call "young-to-old" transfers are transfers from children to their parents or parents-
in-law, and nearly all of what I call "old-to-young" transfers are transfers from parents to their
children or children-in-law.'0
Loans,  1992/93.
In addition to gifts, the 1992/93 VLSS contains information on inter-household
borrowing-but little about lending.  This discrepancy was fixed in the 1997/98 VLSS, so I put
off detailed discussion of loans until the next section.  But the earlier survey's reasonably detailed
information  about borrowing  is nonetheless  useful, for it shows that loans were widespread in
1992/93.  Including loans in the definition of transfers received would almost double the
percentage of recipient households,  from 23 to 43 percent.  And adding loans to gifts  in the
'0  These percentages,  92 and 98 percent respectively, are based on calculations  from the VLSS.  The
remaining 8 percent of transfers from young to old were given to grandparents,  and the remaining 2 percent
of transfers  from old to young were given to grandchildren, nieces and nephews.12
definition of transfers nearly doubles the percentage of private transfers in total income-from 8 to
15 percent.  I explore these issues further in the next section, which analyzes the  1997/98 VLSS's
more comprehensive data on loans.
B.  Cross-sectional  patterns,  1997/98  VLSS
One of the reasons for conducting  1997/98 VLSS was to create a panel by re-interviewing  the
1992/93 VLSS households.  But before analyzing the panel, I explore two simpler issues, using
just the  1997/98 cross-section  of the VLSS.  The first issue concerns the stability of the cross-
sectional private transfer patterns over time.  They are indeed quite stable; the patterns found in
1992/93 are mostly repeated in 1997/98.  The second issue concerns changes  in the  1997/98
survey.  Households  were asked more detailed questions about inter-household  loans and public
transfers, and they were asked what their gifts and loans spent on (e.g., to finance a consumer
durable, buy food, etc.).
The  1997/98 VLSS is larger than the  1992/93 VLSS;  1200 new households were added in
order to facilitate disaggregated analyses.  The new households  are not a self-weighted  sample;
urban areas and certain regions were over-sampled."  So I use the survey weights in the tables
below.
A comparison of the two cross sections shows that Vietnam's economic growth has not
reduced its private transfer activity; transfers were just as large and widespread in 1997/98  as they
were in 1992/93.  Table 5 classifies households according to their involvement with private
transfers in 1997/98.  The first two columns of Table 5 replicate Table 1 does for the 1992/93
households.  I find that the percentage of households participating in private transfers (as givers,
recipients, or both) is slightly higher in 1997/98 than in 1992/93-39 percent versus  35 percent.
The next two columns in Table  5 are based  on an expanded definition  of private transfers,
which  includes  inter-household  borrowing  and  lending.  (This  was  not  possible  to  do  for  the
" In addition to urban households,  rural households  in the Central Coast,  Central Highlands and Southeast
were over-sampled.13
1992/93  VLSS,  which  had  only  limited  information  about household  lending.)  Expanding  the
definition of transfers to include loans raises the percentage of households  involved with transfers
Table  5--Households  Involved in Private Transfers,  1997/98
A Comparison of Gifts and Gifts plus L  oans
Gifts  Gifts plus  Loans
N  e  N  %
(1)  Hh's involved in priv.  t-fers  2208  37. 2  3112  52.4
Hh's who only gave  830  14. 0  895  15.1
Hh's who only received  1091  18. 4  1677  28.2
Hh's who did both  287  4.8  540  9.1
(2)  Hh's who neither gave nor rec'd  3732  62. 8  2828  47.6
Total  (1)  +  (2)  5940  100 .0  5940  100.0
to 52 percent from the 37 percent based on just gifts (first row, Table 5).  The loans are large.
Adding them to gifts raises the proportion of private transfers in total income to 12 percent from the
7 percent figure based on gifts (Table 6, second and fourth columns).
Public transfers were under-counted  in the 1992/93 survey because  social subsidies were
not specified clearly.  The 1997/98 survey gathered more detail about social  subsidies and added
questions about government poverty  alleviation and NGO assistance.  Despite these changes
Table 6--Transfers  and Total Income,  199 7/98
Private  Private  Public
(Gifts)  (Gif ts &  Loans)
Transfers  as a pct.  of total income
All households  6.8  12.2  3.1
Recipient-households  25.3  32.7  17.6
Number of recipient households  1379  2217  1178
Pct.  of recipient households with
pre-transfer income  in  lowest quintile  24.9  22.0  25.914
public transfers are still only 3 percent of total income, a good deal less than that of private
transfers, regardless of how the latter are defined (Table 6). 1  2
The  1992/93 survey results suggested that private transfers were slightly better targeted
than public transfers were.  Table 6 overturns that conclusion.  Among the households  receiving
public transfers, 26 percent were from the lowest income quintile (where "income"  is measured
before private or public transfers).  The equivalent figure for households receiving private transfers
is either 25 or 22 percent,  depending on whether loans are counted as part of private transfers.  So
it appears that, at least by the crude measures in Table 6, public transfers are slightly better than
private ones in reaching  the poorest households.
Table  7--Household  Economic  Situation  by Transfer  Status,  1997/98  VLSS
Two Different Criteria for Transfer Status are Used:
Gifts Only versus Gifts Plus  Loans
Net  Net
Givers  Recipients  Others
Pre-private-transfer income
Gifts Only  4677  2925  2634
Gifts Plus Loans  4937  2824  2622
Post-private-transfer income
Gifts Only  4231  4035  2634
Gifts Plus Loans  4213  3940  2622
Fraction of hh economically active
Gifts Only  57.9  49.4  55.9
Gifts Plus Loans  57.9  51.5  56.0
Percentage with unemployed members
Gifts Only  2.1  5.3  3.2
Gifts Plus Loans  2.2  4.5  3.2
Percentage with educated hh head
Gifts Only  54.4  44.8  37.1
Gifts Plus Loans  55.1  41.9  36.0
Number of households
Gifts Only  906  1292  3742
Gifts Plus Loans  1054  2041  2844
1
2See the paper by Dominique van de Walle  for a comprehensive  analysis of Vietnam's public  safety net.
Her measure of public transfers includes a few more categories than mine, such as educational  scholarships,
but these are miniscule compared  to the largest public transfer, the social insurance fund.  So the value of
aggregate  public transfers that I use above is nearly identical to the one that she uses.15
As with the 1992/93 VLSS, private transfers in the 1997/98 VLSS appear to flow from
better off to worse-off households.  Table 7 contrasts the economic characteristics  of net givers
and net recipients.  The entries  in Table 7 marked "Gifts Only," replicate for the 1997/98 VLSS
what was done in Table 3 for the 1992/93  VLSS.  As for 1992/93, the 1997/98 pre-private-transfer
income of net givers greatly exceeds that of recipients, with incomes of "others," those not
involved with gifts, in-between these two.  What is new about Table 7 is that it repeats the analysis
with transfers defined as loans plus gifts. Table 7 shows that, regardless of how private transfers
are defined, givers are in better economic shape than recipients are.
Table  8--Household Demographics by Transfer Status,  1997/98
Two Different  Criteria  for Transfer Status  are Used:
Gifts Only versus Gifts Plus  Loans
Net  Net
Givers  Recipients  Others
Percentage headed by young
Gifts Only  3.2  4.3  6.5
Gifts Plus  Loans  4.4  5.6  5.8
Percentage headed by elderly
Gifts Only  12.2  30.2  16.0
Gifts Plus  Loans  12.5  23 .6  17.0
Percentage headed by female
Gifts Only  22.1  33 .4  21.5
Gifts Plus  Loans  20.6  29 .8  21.5
Percentage with absent  members
Gifts Only  12.6  10 .8  9.4
Gifts  Plus  Loans  11.8  10 .9  9.1
Household size
Gifts Only  5.3  5. 0  5.6
Gifts  Plus  Loans  5.2  5. 2  5.7
Number of  households
Gifts Only  906  12 92  3742
Gifts Plus  Loans  1054  2041  2844
The inclusion of loans does not matter for demographic patterns either, which are
contrasted for givers, recipients,  and "others" in Table 8. The patterns are similar whether or not16
loans are counted.  And the patterns  for gifts in Table 8  are similar to their 1992/93 counterparts  in
Table 4.
Sources of  Loans versus Gifts,  199 7/98.
Though the inclusion of loans with gifts matters little for contrasting the characteristics of givers
and recipients, the two forms of transfer do differ markedly in one respect.  Gifts flow almost
exclusively between relatives, but loans do not.  Half of all loan money flows between non-related
people, described by survey respondents as "friends".or "neighbors."  These informal  loans
comprised one-third of total lending.  The remaining two-thirds came from formal or quasi-formal
sources such; as banks, government credit programs, cooperatives, revolving credit associations  or
money lenders,  and these are not counted as inter-household  loans.'.
People who borrowed from other households reported their relationship to the creditor
(e.g., parent, child, friend); those who lent money reported their relationship to the borrower.
Half of the value of these informal loans occurs among non-relatives (Figure 2).  The equivalent
figure for gifts is a mere 2 percent (Figure 3).
D  4%  Young  to old
D  19%  Sibling to sibling
11%  Old  to  young
o  17%  Between  other  relaUvei
o  50%  Betw.  friends  &  neighbc
Fiaure  -2.-  Flows -of Informal  LendirncQ.  1997/9817
Another innovation in the 1997/98 survey was the inclusion of questions about how gifts
were used-whether for general consumption or for some investment-related  purpose, such as
schooling, investments  in a farm or family business, or payment toward a house.  A similar
question was asked about borrowing, though the choices were different.  One of these, to "buy
food before harvest" clearly designated consumption,  so I lumped it with "general consumption" to
classify consumption loans.: Several other choices, such as "working capital  ,"  "basic
investment,"  "build or buy house," and "schooling" clearly represented investment and I classified
them as such.  I also classified the response "buy consumer durables"  as investment.'4 Still
others, for example, to "repay a loan" or to "re-lend" were harder to classify, so I ignored them in
constructing the breakdown of loans by purpose.
[]  39%  Young to  old
o  23%  Sibling to  sibling
96  -,  l,4ill  \  ,  22%  Old  to  young
o  6%  Spouse  to spouse
o1  8%  Between  other  relatives
0  2%  Between  non-relatives
Figure  3.  Generational  Directions  of  Private;  Transfers,  1997/98
" Labeling a source of credit "informal"  is arbitrary to some extent. I defined informaiity  conservatively, by
including just relatives,  friends and neighbors.  Obviously credit cooperatives,  moneylenders  and the like
could be counted as inforrnal sources as well.
14 Sometimes purchases of durables are treated as consumption  (e.g., the United States National Income and
Product Accounts,)  and sometimes as  investment (the United States Flow of Funds Accounts).  The latter is
closer to the economic concept of inv estment-the act of paying now and enjoying later-as in buying a
radio or bicycle that generates  services  over many years.18
Gifts and loans are used differently.  Nearly three-quarters of gifts-but less than one-tenth
of loans-are spent for consumption (Table 9).  Some might argue that the distinction between
gifts and loans is little more than semantics-a gift, for example, could be reciprocated, or a loan
made below market interest.  But the evidence above suggests there is more to the difference
between loans  and gifts than just labeling.  They are used for different things and flow between
different pairs of households.
Table 9--Uses  of Gifts versus Loans,  199 7/98
Gifts  Loans
Consumption  71.6  9.3
Investment  28.4  90.7
Total  100.0  100.0
Intra-household  Transfers and Co-residence.
The ideal study would track transfers between everyone, not just people from different
households.  But it would require elaborate measurements  dealing with individual consumption
and contributions to incomes of family farms and businesses that are beyond the scope of the
VLSS.  Nonetheless,  it is possible to learn something about intra-household  transfers from the
data.  After all, the fact that a household  contains persons who are not doing market work is prima
facie evidence that some sort of transfer is occurring within the household.  I can calculate rough
estimates of the intra-household transfers conditional  on simplifying  assumptions.  The purpose is
not to pinpoint exact intra-household transfers, which is not possible.  Instead it is merely to
demonstrate that intra-household  transfers can, under plausible assumptions, far exceed inter-
household transfers.  The calculations  are based on 1992/93 data, but using 1997/98  data would
not alter the conclusions.
Imagine that total household income is divided for equal consumption among those doing
market work and other persons.  A "market workei" is someone reported to be economically  active
as a wage worker or participant  in the family farm or business.  Since most income (about five-19
sixths on average)  comes from work, market workers implicitly transfer money to persons not
engaged in market work.  Assume for simplicity that all consumption is private so there are no
complications  from non-excludability  or economies of scale.  Finally,  count children aged 0 to 4 as
0.4 of an adult and children 5  to  14 as 0.5 of an adult.'5
These assumptions imply an average intra-household transfer of 187 TDY.  Most of it, 102
TDY, goes to children 14 or under, but that still leaves a substantial 85 TDY being transferred
between adults.  These crude calculations  show that intra-household transfers are potentially much
larger than inter-household  transfers.  Even just counting transfers to adults, this crude estimate of
intra-household transfers is about double that of inter-household transfers.'6
Another, and in some ways complementary, intra-household  transfer is the value of shared
living arrangements  for parents.  These are difficult to measure  in the VLSS because it is hard to
identify the persons responsible for making mortgage or rent payments.  But the proportion of
households headed by adult children living with non-working parents, in-laws, or grandparents
gives a rough idea of how widespread these shared living arrangements might be-and 8 percent
of the households  in the 1992/93 VLSS fit this description.
Still another form of transfer that occurs within the household is the exchange of time-
intensive, in-kind services between household  members.  The VLSS contains information about
time each individual spends in housework:  preparing meals, washing clothes, working around the
house, cleaning house, and the like.  With some assumptions about how such services are
produced and shared, we can get an idea of how large these implicit,  time-intensive intra-
household transfers are.  For example,  suppose such services are excludable,  and suppose too that
the same equivalence scales apply to consumption of these services  as apply to other forms of
consumption.  Assume also that adults are more efficient at producing services than children are,
and, for convenience, assume that these productivity differentials  are the same as the consumption
equivalence scales.  Finally, suppose,  again for simplicity, that there are no economies of scale in
IS See Deaton (1997),  page 259 for a discussion of these equivalence  scales.20
household production.  (To illustrate, if a grandmother spends two hours cooking for herself and
three other adults, those other adults each receive one half hour of in-kind time transfers from her.)
Applying this method to the 1992/93 VLSS, using the information about housework, generates an
average of 14 hours of time transfers per household per week.  If this time is exchanged for the
consumption provided by household members who work, then net intra-household transfers
would be much lower than the figures cited above.
Discussions of intra-household transfers are necessarily speculative because they are based
on assumptions about unobservables such as household sharing rules.  They are intended only to
illustrate the potential for intra-household transfers to exceed inter-household transfers.  A full
accounting of transfers between all individuals  would be a daunting task that is beyond the scope
of this paper.
C.  Panel  Evidence
Cross sections leave several questions unanswered.  They provide only a snapshot of
private-transfer  pattems and reveal nothing about a household's experience  over time.  Does
receiving  transfers now make it more likely that they will be received later?  Does transfer behavior
respond to changes in the household's  socioeconomic status?  A panel is needed to address
questions like these.
Using the panel, I that transfers  are indeed responsive to changes in socioeconomic status.
For example, households headed by someone who retired between surveys tend to receive
increases in private transfers, as do those whose health expenditures increased.  The following
sections provide more detail about these and other patterns.
Income changes.
A leading issue in the literature on private transfers is how responsive they are to changes
in household  income.  Indeed,  such responsiveness  is the key to the problem of "crowding out," in
which, for example,  the introduction of public transfers would tend to supplant private ones.
16 The disparity between intra- and inter-household transfers  in Vietnam appears a good deal smaller, though,
than the one  reported for rural Pakistan by Kochar (2000), who finds that the predominant form of transfer21
income responsiveness  is critical too for detennining whether private transfers  insure households
against income shortfalls or redistribute  income to the less fortunate.
Most empirical  evidence on the income effects of  private transfers is based on cross
sections.  But cross-sectional  evidence is of limited use for measuring the responsiveness of
transfers to income, because  contrasting transfer receipts for high- versus low-income  households
is not the same thing as looking at changes in transfers for the same household  who was once rich
but is now poor.
Settling the issue of crowding out is beyond the scope of this simple descriptive analysis.
Still, the descriptions that follow are illuminating in several respects.  They show,  for example,
that there is enormous heterogeneity in private transfer responses.  Events like retirement seem to
matter a lot for transfer changes, while others,  such as marriage of a son or daughter, do not
appear to matter much at all.
I first explore how transfer status changes between surveys.  Ninety percent of the
households  in the 1992/93 survey were re-interviewed in  1997/98.  Most of those not re-
interviewed had moved; many others were dropped deliberately.  Only a handful were refusals.'7
Eliminating the few others with missing information leaves a panel of 4,269 households.
How many of the households who were recipients in 1992/93  changed into givers by
1997/98?  How many remained recipients?  Table  10 provides  answers to questions like these.
Many households changed transfer status between surveys.  Nonetheless  the data do indicate  some
inertia in transfer status.  For example, only  11  percent of the net recipients in the  1992/93 survey
became net givers in  1997/98,  which is less than the unconditional  1997/98 figure of 15 percent
(Table  10).  Nearly half of net recipients  in 1992/93 remained so in 1997/98, even though the
unconditional  1997/98 figure is less than one-fourth.  Households who did not change their
transfer status between surveys, and thus are located on the diagonal of Table  10, represent 59
percent of the sample.
from young to old occurs  in the form of co-residence rather than cash transfers  between households.
17 For more detail on panel attrition, s ee the Appendix.22
Table  10.  Transitions  in  transfers  between  1992/93  and  1997/98
Transfer  I
status,  I  Transfer  status,  1997/98
1992/93  |  Net  giver  Other  Net  recip  Total
_-______  +  _--____--_________-_--  - ---- __-_____+__-_-_
Net giver  |  155  317  99  |  571
I  27.2  55.5  17.3  100.0
_-------------_  -________-____  ---------- _--  - - ---+-  ------
Other  391  1933  480  2804
I  13.9  68.9  17.1  100.0
_-  __  _  _  +_  ____  _  _-  _____  ___  _______-_+-  _____
Net  recipient  |  98  372  424  894
11.0  41.6  47.4  100.0
_-___________+_  ________-4  ------------------  -------
Total  644  2622  1003  |  4269
I  15.1  61.4  23.5  I  100.0
What variables are correlated with changes in transfers?  One way to address this question
is to look at changes in some of the variables I examined in the cross-sections to see how they are
related to changes in transfers.  For example, we can compare changes in transfers  for households
who experienced shortfalls versus windfalls in pre-private-transfer income.  These calculations are
provided in Table  11.
The first two rows of Table  11 split the sample by whether household income rose or fell
between surveys.  Income  is measured before private transfers.'8 It is also measured on a per-
capita basis, as are transfers.'9 Both income and transfers are adjusted for inflation.  For each
survey,  transfers are calculated as receipts minus gifts, or "net transfer inflows."  These  inflows
are positive or negative depending on whether receipts or gifts are larger.  Changes in private
transfers are
AT = (Receipts in 1997/98 survey - Gifts in  1997/98 survey) -
(Receipts in 1992/93 survey - Gifis in 1992/93 survey),
which is the difference in net transfer inflows between survey years.
I  Pre-private transfer income is defined as income from all sources except private transfers  received. A
further possible adjustment, which  I did not make, would be to add private transfers given to pre-private-
transfer income.  It is not clear whether this is the proper pre-transfer mcome measure, however, because
gifts might be financed out of household  wealth rather than  income.23
Pre-private-transfer  income and net inflows of private transfers tend to move in opposite
directions.  Households with income shortfalls are more likely to experience  increased transfer
inflows.  For example,  32.5 percent of households whose pre-private-transfer income fell had
increases  in net transfer inflows between surveys, compared to 25.8 percent for households whose
pre-private-transfer  income rose.  Households who had particularly severe shortfalls  in pre-private-
transfer income-decreases of 50 percent or more-were even more likely to have had a boost in
transfer inflows.  Nearly 36 percent of these households had increases  in transfer inflows,
compared  to only 26 percent among households  whose pre-private-transfer,  per-capita incomes
increased between surveys.20
Table  11.  Increases  versus  decreases  in  real  private  transfers  per-capit a
by  windfalls  versus  shortfalls  in  pre-private-transf er  income  per-capita
Percentage  of  households  whose  excess  of  receipt s  over  gifts...
incr eased  decreased  s tayed  Total
the  same
Subsample:
Households  whose  real
pre-private-transfer
income...
increased  25.8  28.8  4  5.4  100.0
n=2703  (649  of  sample)
decreased  32.5  22.7  4 4.8  100.0
n=1518  (36% of  sample)
decreased  over  50%  35.9  24.7  3  9.4  100.0
n=587  (14% of  sample)
However, while Table  11  indicates that pre-transfer income and private transfer inflows
tend to move in opposite directions, there are many households  for which the two move in the
'9 Household size is adjusted for equivalence  scales:  children aged 0 to 4 count for 0.4 of an adult, and
children aged 5 to 14 count for 0.5 of an adult.
20 The estimated con-elation  between changes in  per-capita,  pre-private-transfer income and changes  in per-
capita private transfers  is negative (though small) and significant at any popular level ( r  = -0.106,
estimated t-value, -6.93).  To take account of the effects of outliers,  I applied a hyperbolic sine
transformation for each variable.  The hyperbolic  sine function,  h(z)  = ln(z +  z  + 1) is similar to a
logarithm, except that it can be applied to negative values24
same direction.  For example, 22.66 percent of the households experiencing  shortfalls in pre-
private-transfer income also experienced shortfalls  in net transfer inflows between surveys.
Table  12 repeats the same calculations  as Table  11, but only for those households whose
1992/93 pre-transfer incomes were less than the median, to see if the responsiveness of private
transfers was more pronounced for households whose incomes were already low.  The results,
presented in Table  12, support this idea.  For example, 45.5 percent of low-income households
whose incomes fell more than 50 percent had increases in net transfer inflows, compared to just
25.5 percent of low-income households  whose incomes increased.
Table  12.  Increases versus decreases in private transfers per-capita by
windfalls versus shortfalls  in  pre-private-transfer  income per-capita
restricted  sample:  households  with below-median per-capita incomes  in
1992/93
Percentage  of  households whose excess of receipts  over gifts...






increased  25.5  27.8  46.7  100.0
(n=1677)
decreased  33.9  21.2  44.9  100.0
(n=434)
decreased over 50%  45.5  25.0  29.5  100.0
(n=132)
How large are these changes in transfers?  The variation is enormous.  For example,
consider households who had income shortfalls.  Define a household's "transfer derivative"  as
AT/AI, where AI denotes the household's change  in per-capita, pre-private-transfer  income.  A
transfer derivative of-l means the entire shortfall was offset by increased private transfers.  A
positive transfer derivative indicates that income changes are exacerbated  by changes in private25
transfers.  The value of the transfer derivatives at the 10'  and 90'  percentiles were -0.75  and
0.29, respectively-an  exceedingly wide range.
Apply the following admittedly arbitrary rule for identifying protection against income
shortfalls.  Classify as "insured" a household whose increases in transfers offset a third or more of
its income shortfall-i.e., one with a transfer derivative  of -0.33  or lower.  At the other end of the
spectrum,  call households with transfer derivatives larger than 0.33 "destabilized,"  since they
simultaneously  experience a reduction in both income and transfers.  By these definitions, a about
15 percent of the households were insured, and about 9 percent destabilized, by private transfers
(Table  13).  I repeated the calculations  for households  with less-than-median,  1992/93 pre-transfer
income.  For this sub-sample nearly 24 percent were insured and nearly  1  1 percent destabilized.
Table 13.  Changes  in private transfers per-capita for households  who
have shortfalls in their pre-private-transfer income  per-capita
Percentage of households who are.
insured  destabilized  ne ither  Total
All households
with shortfall  14.9  9.3  75.8  100.0
(n=1518)
Poor households
with shortfall  23.7  10.8  65.4  100.0
(n=434)
Economic and  demographic events.
How are things like retirement, the loss of earners, the birth of children, and other
significant events related to private transfers?  One way to explore this issue is to contrast the
percentages of housenoics  expenencmg increases versus decreases in per-capita private transfers
for various sub-samples (Table 14).  For a benchmark the first row of Table  14 provides figures
for the entire sample.  I contrast these with the other rows, which pertain to select sub-samples.
Calculations for the first six sub-samples  in Table 14 explore the role of private transfers as
old-age support.  They suggest that life events such as retirement and widowhood increase inflows26
of private transfers.  For example, consider the second row, which gives the percentages of
households whose private transfers  increased, decreased and remained unchanged for households
whose head retired between surveys.2'  Nearly 41 percent of them had an increase in private-
transfer inflows, compared to just 28 percent for the whole sample.  Conversely, only 19.7 percent
of them had a decrease in net inflows, compared with 26.6 percent for the entire sample.  The third
row in Table 14 shows similar though slightly less dramatic  results for the retirement of non-
heads.  Widowhood  is also associated with increases in private transfers.  The death of an elderly
person between surveys is associated  with decreases  in private transfer inflows, further evidence
that private transfers act like old-age support.
Table  14.  Increases  versus  decreases  in  per-capita  private  transfers
by economic and demographic events
Percentage  of  households  whose private transfers...
increased  decreased  stayed  Total
the  same
Entire  sample  28.2  26.6  45.2  100.0
(n,4221)
Subsample:
Household head retired  41.0  19.7  39.4  100.0
(n=315)
Non-head retires  36.4  25.3  38.4  100.0
(n=198)
Widowed since  1992/93  33  28.9  38.1  100.0
(n=97)
Elderly person died  27.1  30.4  42.6  100.0
(n=336)
Son(s)  left home  31.2  29.6  39.1  100.0
(n=746)
Daughter(s)  left home  31.5  27.3  41.2  100.0
(n=816)
Loss of  earner  31.3  25.1  43.6  100.0
(n=1476)
Gain of  earner  25.6  27.7  46.6  100.0
(n=1400)
Son(s)  married  29.2  25.3  45.5  100.0
(n=672)
Daughter(s)  married  29.5  25.8  44.7  100.0
(n=662)
New  child/children  25.1  23.9  51.1  100.0
(n=854)
2 "Retirement  is defined as being economically active in Round I but not Round 2, for someone aged 50 or
over in Round  1.27
Having a child leave home has a less pronounced association with private transfers.  The sub-
sample with one or more sons leaving home between surveys had a larger-than-average  percentage
with increases, in private transfer inflows.  But this sub-sample also had a larger-than-average
percentage  with decreases in private transfer inflows.  This finding is consistent with the idea that
some sons are sources of increased receipts for parents while others are targets of increased gifts.
The same pattern holds for daughters  who left home (Table 14).
Changes  in private transfers are not just restricted to economic and demographic  changes
associated with the aging of households.  Losing an earner, regardless of his or her age, is
associated with higher percentages of households with increases in net private transfer inflows.
Conversely,  gaining an earner is associated with lower percentages  with increases in net private
transfer inflows.
The arrival of children is associated with mixed results for changes in private transfers.
The sample with new children had a slightly smaller percentage with increases in transfer inflows,
but a slightly smaller percentage with decreases in transfer inflows too.
Marriage appears to have little effect on changes  in transfers.  The percentages of
households whose  transfers increased, decreased and remained unchanged differ little for
households whose children married between surveys compared to the entire sample.  This is not to
say, however,  that marriage has little impact on total transfers.  There are one-time expenditures
and gifts that are related to the marriage ceremony, but these are not counted in the transfers
variable.  They are recorded in separate sections of the survey.22
I used this information, from the 1997/98 survey, to approximate wedding-related
expenditures  and gifts.  I say "approximate" because the VLSS lumps together funeral-related gifts
22I did not include these expenditures and gifts as part of inter-household transfers for several reasons.  First,
unlike the transfer measures above, there is no information about the sources of transfers received or the
destinations  of transfers given.  For example,  the recipients of expenditures  for the wedding ceremony
encompasses a diffuse group that includes  wedding guests.  Second, the kinds of transfers directly connected
with life events such as weddings, funerals or holidays are likely to be behaviorally  quite different from
other kinds of transfers.  For instance, wedding expenditures might include a substantial signaling
component,  intended to  demonstrate  family cohesiveness and/or intentions to provide future resources.  This
kind of behavior  lies outside  the realm of more conventional theories  about private transfers,  and as such
deserves  a completely separate analysis which  is beyond the scope of this paper.28
with wedding gifts.  The value of these one-time gifts -is substantial.  Among households  who had
one or more sons marrying  between surveys the average weddmg expense, expressed as a fraction
of their average total expenditures,  was 8.1  percent.  This number is.all the more striking because
the base includes not just households with sons who married in the previous year, but households
with sons who married  within the 5 or so years between surveys.  In contrast, the wedding
expenditure  and gift data refer just to the previous  12 months.
Part of the expense is defrayed by the receipt of gifts.  Those same households received
wedding-related  (but also possibly funeral-related,  see above) gifts equal to 4.4 percent of total
income.  The comparable  figures for households  having at least one daughter marry are 5.7 percent
(expenses) and 4.3 percent (gifts).
Changes  in private  transfers are strongly related to changes  in health expenditures.
Consider the sample of households who increased the fraction of total spending on health by 5  or
more percentage points between surveys (those marked "Health expenditures up" in Table 15).
Forty percent of these households had increases in net transfer inflows.  The causality likely goes
both ways-illness could prompt increases in private transfers,  which in tum could help finance
increased health expenditures.  Likewise,  a reduction in spending for health is associated with
reductions in private transfers.
But changes in illness per  se appear to have little impact on changes in transfers (final four
rows, Table  15).  The proportions of households experiencing  increases versus decreases  in
transfers between surveys differed little among sub-samples with changes in the number of  people
who were ill.  Like other life events, the effects of illness and other health-related  events on private
transfers merits further,  separate study; the relationship between the two is likely to be complex.
For example, becoming ill could raise someone's marginal utility of income if  the illness is
treatable, but reduce it if it is not.
A Simple Regression
What are the partial correlations between the variables discussed in Tables  12 through  15?  Are
they statistically significant?  To get a sense of these, I depart from sunple cross-tabulations  and29
Table  15.  Increases  versus  decreases  in  per-capita  private  transfers
by  h ealth related  eve nts
Percentage  of  households  whose  private  transfers
in  creased  decreased  stayed  Total
the  same
Entire  sample  28  .2  26.6  45.2  100.0
(n=4221)
Subsample:
Health  expenditures  up  40  .6  22.2  37.3  100.0
(n=604)
Health  expenditures  down  24  .5  29.9  45.6  100.0
(n=6882)
Subtracted  ill  27.5  27.4  45.0  100.0
(n=1888)
Added  ill  27  .9  27.0  45.1  100.0
(n-2791)
Only  subtracted  ill  27  .6  25.9  46.5  100.0
(n=815)
Only  added  ill  28  .1  26.0  45.9  100.0
(n-1718)
regress changes in net transfers received on the econornic and life-course variables  from Tables  14
and 15.  But the goal is still descriptive, and I emphasize that I am not attempting to estimate a
causal model.  For example, recall from above that health care expenditures are likely to be caused
by private transfers as well as vice versa.  The same could be true of several of  the other right-
hand-side variables in Table 16.
Table 16 conveys two messages.  The first is that the regression  results mostly reinforce
what was shown in the cross-tabulations.  For example, income increases  are associated with
reductions in private transfers.  Second, it appears that economic events bear a more significant
relationship to transfers than life-course events per se.  For instance,  losing an eamer or suffering
an income decline are both significantly related to changes in transfers, whereas widowhood is not.30
Of course, to move beyond merely describing correlations would require attention to problems of
endogeneity,  something that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Table  16.  Regression of  differences in log net  transfers receipts
per-capita on  economic and demographic events
Estimated  Estimated  Variable
coefficient  t-value  mean
Explanatory variable
A in per-capita  log income  -0.192  - 5.82  0.33
Loss of  earner  0.314  2.78  0.35
Gain of  earner  -0.290  -3.22  0.33
Household head retired  0.661  4.13  0.07
Non-head retired  0.361  1.83  0.05
Widowed since 1992/93  - 0.070  -0.18  0.03
Elderly person died  - 0.035  -0.20  0.08
Household head died  0.280  0.68  0.03
Child left  home  - 0.043  -0.30  0.31
Child married  - 0.046  -0.34  0.21
New child/children  - 0.026  -0.24  0.20
Health expenditures  up  0.564  4.66  0.14
Health expenditures down  - 0.253  -2.42  0.21
Added ill person  - 0.106  -1.18  0.66
Subtracted  ill person  0.06  0.07  0.45
Number of observations  4221
Dependent variable mean  0.06
R-squared  0.03
F-statistic  8.84331
D.  Private  transfers,  regional  boundaries  and  economic,  growth
Vietnam experienced tremendous economic growth during the 1990's, DUT  some places, sucn as
cities in the south, grew much faster than others, such as rural areas in the northem mountains.
Uneven growth increased  divergence between the living standards of rich and poor.  Is it possible
that private inter-household transfers helped to narrow the widening gap?  For this to happen,
private transfers would have to cross regional boundaries.  In this section, I investigate regional
patterns of private transfers and contrast transfer behavior in Vietnam's "growth poles" with
transfer behavior in the rest of the country.  I find that, while much money is being transferred
between locales, most of it stays within the vicinity.  I also find that economic  growth is associated
with more transfer activity, not less.
Private  transfers and  regional  boundaries.
I divided Vietnam into 13 locales, using the VLSS's regional definitions and distinctions between
urban and rural areas.  The 1992/93 VLSS divided the country into 7 regions:  the Northern
Uplands, the Red River Delta (which includes the Hanoi-Haiphong  corridor), the North Central
region, the Central Coast (which includes Danang), the Central Highlands, the Southeast (which
includes Ho Chi Minh City), and the Mekong River Delta.  Only the Central Highlands  is
completely rural.  For the others I separated urban and rural place, generating 13 separate locales in
all.
Respondents report where transfer receipts came from and where gifts went, so I can
identify transfers within and between locales.  In addition, some transfers came from outside
Vietnam, and, in a few cases, were sent outside Vietnam.
Fifty-three  percent of the transfers in 1992/93 were between households  in the same locale
(Figure 4).  Thirty-five percent crossed local boundaries,  and 12 percent crossed international
boundaries.  Figure 4 is constructed from transfer events, with no adjustment for the amount of
money transferred.  Figure 5 is based on the monetary value of transfers,  and provides quite a
different picture of regional pattems, and shows that the really large transfers occur internationally.
So the breakdown of the money value of transfers, in Figure 5, gives a picture that is quite a bit32
different from Figure 4.  Intemational  transfers are over ten times larger than domestic ones.  So
while only  12 percent of  all transfers are international, they represent 63 percent of the money
transferred.
D  53%  Within  the  locale
o  05%  Acoss  locales
*  12%  Intwnational
Figure  4.  Regional  Incidence  of  Private  Transfers,  1992/93
O  23%  Wittn  the  locale ol  15%  Across  locales
8  3%L
Figure  5.  Regional  Value  of  Private  Transfers,  1992/9333
In contr,ast,,there is not much.differen,e  in average.domesticqtransfers  that occurs within
versus betw,e,n,locales.23 The,ratio;ofwithin-local,eto between-locale transfers  is about 3:2.
whether measured in terms of events or money.
Urban-rural  t*ansferflows.
Another way to characterize the geographic patterns of transfers  is by urban/rural status.  Most
transfers do not cross urban-rural boundaries.  The ones that do are mostly urban-to-rural
transfers.  For example, Figure 6 is based on domestic transfer events, and it shows that 70
percent of all transfers were either rural-to-rural (51  percent) or urban-to-urban  (19 percent).
Among transfers that cross urban-rural boundaries, about 3 transfers flow from the city to the
countryside for every one flowing in the opposite direction.  Figure 7 repeats these calculations but
tracks the money value of transfers instead of events.  The numbers are different, because more
money is transferred among the urban households,  who are richer on average.  But the conclusions
are the same-a little over 70 percent of the money transferred does not cross urban-rural
boundaries.
0  19%  Urban  to Urban
D  22%  Urban  to  Rural
/  8% Rural to Urban
D  51%  Rural  to Rural
Figure  6.  Urban/Rural  Incidence  of  Private  Transfers,  1992/93
23 The average within-locale transfer was 570 TbY; the average between-locale  transfer was 532 TDY.  In
contrast, the average international  transfer was 6056 TDY.34
o  40%  Urban  to  Urban
0  21%  Urban  to  Rural
*  6%  Rural to  Urban
0  33%  Rural  to  Rural
Figure  7.  Urban/Rural  Value  of  Private  Transfers,  1992/93
The  1997/98 VLSS.
I constructed the same figures using data from the  1997/98  VLSS  (Figures 8 through  1  1)."  The
regional patterns in private transfers are similar to those in 1992/93, except for the somewhat
diminished importance of the money value of international  transfers in 1997/98 (Figure 9).  Most
domestic transfers still occur within rather than between locales and the ratio of domestic transfers
within versus between locales is still 3:2.  And, as in 1992/93, about 70 percent of transfers  do not
cross urban-rural boundaries.
0  49%  Within  the  locale
D  37%  Across  locales
*  14%  International
Figure  8.  Regional  Incidence  of  Private  Transfers,  1997198
24  1used sarnole weighits  for constructing  the Round 2 figures.35
0  31%  Within  the  locale
o3  20%  Across  locates
X  48%  Intemational
Figure  9.  Regional  Value  of  Private  Transfers,  1997/98
o  32%  Urban  to  Urban
o  22%  Urban  to Rural
*  7% Rural  to Urban
o  39%  Rural to  Rural
Figure  10.  Urban/Rural  incidence  of  Private  Transfers,  1997/98
o  50%  Urban  to Urban
o3  19%  Urban  to  Rural
,3  9%  Rural  to Urban
0  22%  Rural  to Rural
Figure  11.  Urban/Rural  Value  of  Private  Transfers,  1997/9836
Growth poles.
Industrialized urban areas grew the fastest between surveys.  These places-the Hanoi-Haiphong
corridor, Danang,  and Ho Chi Minh City-attracted a disproportionate  share of public investment
(World Bank (2000), p.  18).  How does private transfer activity in these "growth poles" compare
to that of the rest of the country?
I split the sample of households into those residing in growth poles versus those not.  The
"growth pole" households exhibited much more transfer activity in both surveys.  More growth-
pole households were involved in transfers, as givers, recipients, or both (Tables D- 1 and D-2).
Further, the panel evidence in Table 19  indicates that, while a large percentage (40 percent) of
"growth pole" households experienced a decline in net transfer receipts between surveys, over a
third of them had increases in net transfer receipts.  Growth-pole  households are clearly more
active in private transfers.
Part of the reason for the higher transfer activity in growth pole areas could have to do with
income inequality.  Inequality, as measured by the coefficient of variation of log income, is higher
in growth pole areas than in non-growth-pole  areas (Table 20).  This is true for both survey years,
and it is also true whether income is measured before or after private transfers.  If transfers help
equalize  incomes within these areas,  as the numbers in Table 20 suggest they do, then more
inequality in income before  transfers means more scope for income redistribution via private
transfers, and hence more of  them.
Table  17--Households  Involved  in  Private  Transfers  in  1992/93
by  Growth-Pole  Status
Growth-pole  hh's  Non-growth-pole  hh's
Number  Percent  Number  Percent
(1)  Households  involved  319  56.1  1361  32.3
Only  gave  87  15.3  500  11.9
Only  received  183  32.2  710  16.9
Did  both  49  8.6  151  3.6
(2) Neither  gave  nor  rec'd  250  43.9  2848  67.7
Total  (1)  +  (2)  569  100.0  4209  100.037
Table  18.  Households  Involved  in  Private Transfers  in 1997/98
by Growth-Pole Status
Growth-pole hh's  Non-growth-pole hh's
Number  Percent  Number  Percent
(1) Households  involved  544  54.5  1843  37.3
Only gave  146  14.7  667  13.5
Only received  316  31.7  935  18.9
Did both  81  8.2  242  4.9
(2) Neither gave  nor rec'd  455  45.5  3098  62.7
Total  (1) +  (2)  999  100.0  4941  100.0
Table  19.  Increases  versus decreases  in  private  transfers  per-capita by
growth-pole versus  non-growth-pole  residence
Percentage  of  households  whose  excess of  receipts over gifts...




growth-pole areas  33.9  40.1  25.9  100.0
(N,451)
non-growth-pole areas  27.5  25.0  47.5  100.0
(N=3770)
Table 20--Income  Inequality--Growth-pole versus
Non-growth-pole households
Coefficient  of  variation in  household log income
Growth-pole  Non-growth-pole
Income  measure
1992/93  Income before  transfers  .28  .19
1992/93 Income  after transfers  .24  .18
1997/98  Income before  transfers  .24  .20
1997/98  Income  after transfers  .2  .18
E.  Typhoon  Linda
In early November of 1997, the southernmost provinces of the Mekong Delta were hit with a
devastating typhoon, the worst it had seen since  1904.  The tropical typhoon Linda resulted in the
death of over 600 people and destroyed thousands of homes and one half million hectares of rice
fields.  Hardest hit were the provinces  of Ca Mau, Kien Giang, Bac Lieu and Soc Trang. How did
private transfers respond?
This question is difficult to answer because of the structure of the VLSS.  Respondents had
a 12-month reference period for income and private transfers, making it difficult to pinpoint the38
storm's impact. "In  fact,'the documentation cites the long time frame as an advantage, which would
"...help to even out the impact of this natural disaster."  (World Bank (June 2000), p. 37).  Still, it
warns that survey results might have been affected  for households interviewed not long after the
typhoon.
Because of the ambiguity introduced by the time frame, it is difficult to gauge Typhoon
Linda's effect on private transfer behavior.  With this caveat in mind, I used information from the
community questionnaire,  along with information about the path of the storm to identify the
communes  affected.  25  I replicated  the panel analysis of the impact of events on private transfers,
comparing these households with the rest of the sample (Table 21).
Table  21.  Increases  versus  decreases  in  private  transfers  per-capita by
typhoon  versus  no  typhoon
Percentage  of  households  whose  excess  of  receipts  over  gifts...




typhoon  areas  25.59  22.35  52.06  100.0
(N=340)
earlier  interview  34.33  17.91  47.76  100.0
(N=67)
later  interview  23.44  23.44  53.11  100.0
(N=273)
non-typhoon areas  26.38  24.61  49.01  100.0
(N=2885)
For the 340 panel households affected by the typhoon, evidence  of private transfer effects is
mixed.  Compared to the rest of the sample, a slightly smaller percentage of these households  had a
reduction  in net transfer receipts, but a slightly smaller percentage  had an increase too.
Consistent with the documentation's assertions, however,  timing of the interview  appears
to matter for gauging the typhoon's effects.  For the sub-sample  of affected households
interviewed between December  1997 and March  1998, there does appear to be a boost in transfer
inflows.  A much larger-than-average  percentage  of them had increases  in net transfer inflows
25 There were about a dozen communes  outside of the Mekong Delta region also reporting typhoon  damage,
and these were  assumed to have  been affected  by storms other than Typhoon Linda.  The 1992/93  commune39
between surveys,  and a lower-than-average  percentage had reductions net transfer inflows.  But
this result must be interpreted with caution, because  this sub-sample contains only 67 households.
In addition, the Tet holiday was celebrated on January 28,  1998.  Even with a 12 month time
frame, interviews conducted around this time could contain distorted responses because of holiday
related increases in expenditures,  and perhaps transfers as well.
IV.  Conclusion
Typhoon Linda is just one of several issues addressed in this paper that merits its own
individual study and raises several  questions  for future research.  Were households with links to
non-typhoon-prone  provinces better able to maintain their consumption in the face of declining
incomes?  How did the storm affect transfers over and above its impact on income?  For instance,
did it matter that incomes  were affected by an unexpected storm instead of some other reason?
Were risks well diversified,  or did some typhoon victims  find it necessary to provide support to
nearby relatives or neighbors who were affected even more adversely?  Just as many questions
could be posed concerning the association of private transfers with health expenditures, retirement,
and several of the other pattems uncovered by the simple descriptive analyses  in this paper.
Of all the patterns that warrant further investigation,  one of the most pressing is Vietnam's
striking age pattems of private transfers.  Unlike nearly all developed countries-and many
developing countries too-Vietnam's private transfers tend to flow from young to old, rather than
the other way around.  But one hallmark of a developed economy is its preponderance of transfers
from older to younger people.  Will Vietnam's age pattem of private transfers eventually  reverse
itself?  If so, how will its elderly be provisioned in the new regime?  If not, how will Vietnam's
progress in education continue?  Why Vietnam's age patterns  in private transfers are the way they
are, how they might be reversed,  and what the likely consequences of such a reversal would be,
are all critical research  and policy questions for its future.
identification  numbers  for the communes  affected by Typhoon Linda were no.'s 92, 98,  99,  101,  105, 106,
112,  113,  117-120,  and 150.40
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Appendix-Panel Response Rate
Of the 4800 households in the  1992/93 VLSS, 495 of them, or 10 percent, were not re-interviewed in
1997/98.  Of these 495, 96 households were not interviewed because three communes had to be dropped
from the Red River Delta because the over-sampling done in 1997/98.  (The extra 1200 households
included in 1997/98 were not representative of the population,  but were chosen disproportionately  from
cities and other areas, especially the Central Highlands,  to facilitate disaggregated analyses.)  (World
Bank, 2000, pages 27-28).
Of the 495 households, 281 were not re-interviewed because they moved away.  Nineteen were missed
because they were temporarily away from the commune, andl2 refused to be re-interviewed.  One
household was not re-interviewed because it dissolved because of death.  16 other households of the 495
were not re-interviewed for some other reason.  46 households were not re-interviewed  for reasons
unknown.
A summary of the reasons households in the 1992/93 VLSS were not followed up in 1997/98 is provided
below:
Deliberately dropped from the sampling frame  96
Moved away  281
Temporarily away  19
Refused  12
Death  I
Miscellaneous  reasons  16
Unknown reason  46
Reason not recorded  24
Total  495Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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